Resembling Particulars: What Nominalism?

Metaphysica 8 (2):165-178 (2007)
This paper examines a recent proposal for reviving so-called resemblance nominalism. It is argued that, although consistent, it naturally leads to trope theory upon examination for reasons having to do with the appeal of neutrality as regards certain non-trivial ontological theses.
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DOI 10.1007/s12133-007-0014-7
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PhilPapers Archive Matteo Morganti, Resembling Particulars: What Nominalism?
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