Supervenience and computational explanation in vision theory

Philosophy of Science 60 (1):86-99 (1993)
Abstract
According to Marr's theory of vision, computational processes of early vision rely for their success on certain "natural constraints" in the physical environment. I examine the implications of this feature of Marr's theory for the question whether psychological states supervene on neural states. It is reasonable to hold that Marr's theory is nonindividualistic in that, given the role of natural constraints, distinct computational theories of the same neural processes may be justified in different environments. But to avoid trivializing computational explanations, theories must respect methodological solipsism in the sense that within a theory there cannot be differences in content without a corresponding difference in neural states
Keywords Science  Supervenience  Vision  Marr, D
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Mark Sprevak (2010). Computation, Individuation, and the Received View on Representation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):260-270.
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