Graduate studies at Western
Metaphysica 12 (2):183-195 (2011)
|Abstract||The theory of the ontological constitution of material objects based on bare particulars has recently experienced a revival, especially thanks to the work of J.P. Moreland. Moreland and other authors belonging to this â€˜new waveâ€™, however, have focused primarily on the issue whether or not the notion of a â€˜bareâ€™ particular is internally consistent. Not much has been said, instead, about the relation holding between bare particulars and the properties they are supposed to unify into concrete particulars. This paper aims to fill this gap and, making reference primarily to Morelandâ€™s version of the theory, highlight some aspects and consequences of it that have not received due attention so far. It is argued that, given a number of seemingly plausible metaphysical assumptions, supporters of bare particulars are led to either endorse supersubstantivalismâ€”the view that material objects are identical with regions of spaceâ€“timeâ€”or abandon their theory altogether. Whatever one makes of the proposed conclusion, a dialectical structure emerges that puts precise constraints on bare particular ontologies and, therefore, will have to be taken into account in future discussion of these and related topics|
|Keywords||Bare particular Substratum Property Identity Supersubstantivalism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Richard Davis (2004). The Brave New Bare Particularism. The Modern Schoolman 81 (4):267-273.
Richard Brian Davis (2013). Are Bare Particulars Constituents? Acta Analytica 28 (4):395-410.
Richard Brian Davis (2003). 'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars Exposed. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):534 – 548.
J. P. T. MorelandPickavance (2003). Bare Particulars and Individuation Reply to Mertz. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):1 – 13.
Martin Schmidt (2008). On Spacetime, Points, and Bare Particulars. Metaphysica 9 (1):69-77.
Daniel Giberman (2012). Against Zero-Dimensional Material Objects (and Other Bare Particulars). Philosophical Studies 160 (2):305-321.
Andrew M. Bailey (2012). No Bare Particulars. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):31-41.
D. W. Mertz (2003). Against Bare Particulars a Response to Moreland and Pickavance. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):14 – 20.
Theodore Sider (2006). Bare Particulars. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):387–397.
Noa Latham (2002). Spatiotemporal and Spatial Particulars. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):17-35.
Niall Connolly (2011). How the Dead Live. Philosophia 39 (1):83-103.
Timothy Pickavance (2009). In Defence of 'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):155 – 158.
L. Nathan Oaklander (1977). Particulars, Positional Qualities, and Individuation. Philosophy of Science 44 (3):478-490.
Michael J. Loux (ed.) (1970/1976). Universals and Particulars: Readings in Ontology. University of Notre Dame Press.
Added to index2011-09-19
Total downloads184 ( #2,106 of 740,104 )
Recent downloads (6 months)75 ( #474 of 740,104 )
How can I increase my downloads?