Supervaluation can leave truth-value gaps after all

Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):148-156 (1999)
Among other good things, supervaluation is supposed to allow vague sentences to go without truth values. But Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore have recently argued that it cannot allow this - not if it also respects certain conceptual truths. The main point I wish to make here is that they are mistaken. Supervaluation can leave truth-value gaps while respecting the conceptual truths they have in mind.
Keywords vagueness  supervaluation  conceptual truth  truth-value gap
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DOI jphil199996330
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