Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):148-156 (1999)
|Abstract||Among other good things, supervaluation is supposed to allow vague sentences to go without truth values. But Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore have recently argued that it cannot allow this - not if it also respects certain conceptual truths. The main point I wish to make here is that they are mistaken. Supervaluation can leave truth-value gaps while respecting the conceptual truths they have in mind.|
|Keywords||vagueness supervaluation conceptual truth truth-value gap|
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