Subset Realization and Physical Identification

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):317-335 (2011)
According to a prominent line of thought, we can be physicalists, but not reductive physicalists, by holding that mental and other ‘higher-level’ or ‘nonbasic’ properties — properties that are not obviously physical properties — are all physically realized. Spelling this out requires an account of realization, an account of what it is for one property to realize another. And while several accounts of realization have been advanced in recent years,1 my interest here is in the ‘subset view,’ which has often been invoked explicitly in defense of nonreductive physicalist positions.2 The subset view holds that property realization consists in the powers of one property having as a subset the powers of another; ..
Keywords Realization  Nonreductive physicalism  Subset theory  Identity theory
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DOI 10.1353/cjp.2011.0014
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