Sartre, Skinner, and the Compatibilist Freedom to be Authentically

Behavior and Philosophy 26 (1/2):29 - 43 (1998)
An exploration of where a comparison of Sartre and Skinner takes us in attempts to better understand the relationship between the two solitudes or disciplines of psychology: humanistic and scientific psychology. From the splitter's perspective, the Sartrean world appears as the particularly human world of choice; the Skinnerian world as the physical world ruled by necessity. From the lumper's perspective, there appear a number of frequently overlooked similarities between Sartre and Skinner. Taken individually, these similarities are admittedly superficial; but considered collectively they suggest that it is possible to deconstruct the dichotomy of Sartre and Skinner and of the two psychologies.
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