Axiomathes 20 (2 -3):229 - 253 (2010)
|Abstract||David Lewis famously argued against structural universals since they allegedly required what he called a composition “sui generis” that differed from standard mereological com¬position. In this paper it is shown that, although traditional Boolean mereology does not describe parthood and composition in its full generality, a better and more comprehensive theory is provided by the foundational theory of categories. In this category-theoretical framework a theory of structural universals can be formulated that overcomes the conceptual difficulties that Lewis and his followers regarded as unsurmountable. As a concrete example of structural universals groups are considered in some detail.|
|Keywords||Structural Mereology Structural Universals Categories|
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