David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 166 (2):309 - 331 (2009)
In the paper we argue that truth-relativism is potentially hostage to a problem of exhibiting witnesses of its own truth. The problem for the relativist stems from acceptance of a trumping principle according to which there is a dependency between ascriptions of truth of an utterance and ascriptions of truth to other ascriptions of truth of that utterance. We argue that such a dependency indeed holds in the case of future contingents and the case of epistemic modals and that, consequently, the relativist about these domains cannot exhibit witnesses to his relativism. In the appendix we provide some results on the relation between trumping and multi-order relativism.
|Keywords||philpapers: relativism about truth|
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References found in this work BETA
John MacFarlane (2007). Relativism and Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
John MacFarlane (2005). Making Sense of Relative Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.
John MacFarlane (2003). Future Contingents and Relative Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.
Max Kolbel (2004). Faultless Disagreement. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):53-73.
Citations of this work BETA
Dirk Kindermann (2013). Relativism, Sceptical Paradox, and Semantic Blindness. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):585-603.
Annalisa Coliva & Sebastiano Moruzzi (2012). Truth Relativists Can't Trump Moral Progress. Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):48-57.
Michael J. Raven (2011). Attesting the Aristotelian Future. Philosophia 39 (4):751-757.
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