David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (4):447 - 464 (2009)
The hypothetical syllogism is invalid in standard interpretations of conditional sentences. Many arguments of this sort are quite compelling, though, and you can wonder what makes them so. I shall argue that it is our parsimony in regard to connections among events and states of affairs. All manner of things just might, for all we know, be bound up with one another in all sorts of ways. But ordinarily it is better, being simpler, to assume they are unconnected. In so doing, we jump to the conclusions of some compelling but invalid arguments.
|Keywords||Conditionals Induction Parsimony Preferential reasoning|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Dorothy Edgington (1995). On Conditionals. Mind 104 (414):235-329.
Peter Gärdenfors (1986). Belief Revisions and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals. Philosophical Review 95 (1):81-93.
Frank Jackson (ed.) (1991). Conditionals. Oxford University Press.
Isaac Levi (1996). For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference, and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Cambridge University Press.
David Lewis (1979). Scorekeeping in a Language Game. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
Citations of this work BETA
Moti Mizrahi (2013). Why Hypothetical Syllogism is Invalid for Indicative Conditionals. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):40-43.
E. J. Lowe (2010). Another Dubious Counter-Example to Conditional Transitivity. Analysis 70 (2):286-289.
Joseph S. Fulda (2010). The Full Theory of Conditional Elements: Enumerating, Exemplifying, and Evaluating Each of the Eight Conditional Elements. Acta Analytica 25 (4):459-477.
Similar books and articles
Alan Hájek (2009). Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism. Erkenntnis 70 (2):211 - 235.
Stanley Wilcox (1939). The Destructive Hypothetical Syllogism in Greek Logic and in Attic Oratory. [New Haven.
Susanne Bobzien (1997). The Stoics on Hypotheses and Hypothetical Arguments. Phronesis 42 (3):299-312.
D. L. C. Maclachlan (1970). The Pure Hypothetical Syllogism and Entailment. Philosophical Quarterly 20 (78):26-40.
Maroun Aouad & Gregor Schoeler (2002). The Poetic Syllogism According to Al-Farabi: An Incorrect Syllogism of the Second Figure. Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 12 (2):185-196.
John R. Welch (1991). Reconstructing Aristotle: The Practical Syllogism. Philosophia 21 (1-2):69-88.
J. Tate (1940). Stanley Wilcox: The Destructive Hypothetical Syllogism in Greek Logic and in Attic Oratory. Pp. 143. (Yale Dissertation, Photo-Copy of Typescript) 1938. Paper. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 54 (02):113-114.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads105 ( #16,190 of 1,696,585 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #115,608 of 1,696,585 )
How can I increase my downloads?