Acta Analytica 22 (2):155-168 (2007)
|Abstract||Kripke’s most important arguments in Naming and Necessity against the description theory of reference of proper names are the arguments from ignorance and error concerning names of historical figures. The aim of this paper is to put forward a reply to these arguments. The answer to them is grounded on the development of one component of the version of the description theory proposed by the authors that are regarded as the classical contemporary advocates of this theory, namely Searle and Strawson; one of the targets of Kripke’s arguments is precisely the version of the description theory of reference submitted by these authors. The development of that component results in a sort of description theory of reference not affected by Kripke’s arguments from ignorance and error concerning the names of historical figures, deferential descriptivism.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Agustin Arrieta Urtizberea (2005). 'Neptune' Between 'Hesperus' and 'Vulcan': On Descriptive Names and Non-Existence. Acta Analytica 20 (3):48-58.
Claudio F. Costa (2011). A Meta-Descriptivist Theory of Proper Names. Ratio 24 (3):259-281.
Ishani Maitra, Brian Weatherson & Jonathan Ichikawa (forthcoming). In Defense of a Kripkean Dogma. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
David Boersema (2007). Geach on Proper Names. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:37-42.
Eros Corazza (2002). Description-Names. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (4):313-325.
Michael McGlone (2010). Essentialist Arguments Against Descriptivism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):443-462.
Josep Macià (1998). Does Naming and Necessity Refute Descriptivism? Theoria 13 (3):445-476.
Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (2010). Peirce's Pragmatic Theory of Proper Names. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (3):341-363.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads44 ( #25,338 of 549,087 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,317 of 549,087 )
How can I increase my downloads?