The reward event and motivation

Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):169-186 (1990)
In philosophy, the textbook case for the discussion of human motivation is the examination (and almost always, the refutation) of psychological egoism. The arguments have become part of the folklore of our tribe, from their inclusion in countless introductory texts. [...] One of my central aims has been to define the issues empirically, so we do not just settle them by definition. Although I am inclined at present to put my bets on the reward-event theory, with its internalism, monism, and causal primacy of satisfaction, I think we are very far from knowing enough to settle these questions concerning motivation, human or otherwise. The winds of science will blow where they may. In the meantime, we can be a bit more circumspect about what we put in our tribal folklore.
Keywords by-product theory  behavioristic learning theory  electrical stimulation of the brain
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DOI 10.2307/2026679
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Timothy Schroeder (2009). Desire. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 (6):631-639.
Timothy Schroeder (2006). Desire. Philosophy Compass 1 (6):631–639.
Timothy Schroeder (2005). Moral Responsibility and Tourette Syndrome. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):106–123.

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