David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Law and Philosophy 23 (2):111-135 (2004)
Legal positivism's ``separation thesis'' is usually taken in one of two ways: as an analytic claim about the nature of law – roughly, as some version of the Social Thesis; or as a substantive claim about the moral value of law – roughly, as some version of the Value Thesis. In this paper I argue that we should recognize a third kind of positivist separation thesis, one which complements, but is distinct from, positivism's analytic and moral claims. The Neutrality Thesis says that the correct analytic claim about the nature of law does not by itself entail any substantive claims about the moral value of law. I give careful formulations of these three separation theses; explain the relationships between them; and sketch the role that each plays in the positivist approach to law.
|Keywords||legal positivism separation thesis|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Pierluigi Chiassoni (2008). On the Wrong Track: Andrei Marmor on Legal Positivism, Interpretation, and Easy Cases. Ratio Juris 21 (2):248-267.
Giorgio Pino (2014). Positivism, Legal Validity, and the Separation of Law and Morals. Ratio Juris 27 (2):190-217.
Similar books and articles
Philip Schofield (2010). Jeremy Bentham and HLA Hart's ‘Utilitarian Tradition in Jurisprudence’. Jurisprudence 1 (2):147-167.
G. Pino (1999). The Place of Legal Positivism in Contemporary Constitutional States. Law and Philosophy 18 (5):513-536.
Leslie Green (2008). Positivism And The Inseparability Of Law And Morals. New York University Law Review 83:1035--1058.
Joakim Sandberg (2008). Understanding the Separation Thesis. Business Ethics Quarterly 18 (2):213-232.
Robert Alexy (2008). On the Concept and the Nature of Law. Ratio Juris 21 (3):281-299.
Peter Rijpkema (2011). The Inevitability of Moral Evaluation. Ratio Juris 24 (4):413-434.
Robert Alexy (2002). The Argument From Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism. Oxford University Press.
Joakim Sandberg (2008). The Tide is Turning on the Separation Thesis? Business Ethics Quarterly 18 (4):561-565.
Stephen Perry (2009). Beyond the Distinction Between Positivism and Non-Positivism. Ratio Juris 22 (3):311-325.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads689 ( #791 of 1,789,938 )
Recent downloads (6 months)206 ( #959 of 1,789,938 )
How can I increase my downloads?