Graduate studies at Western
Analysis 63 (4):297–300 (2003)
|Abstract||Three confirmation principles discussed by Hempel are the Converse Consequence Condition, the Special Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition. Le Morvan (1999) has argued that, when the choice among confirmation principles is just about them, it is the Converse Consequence Condition that must be rejected. In this paper, I make this argument definitive. In doing that, I will provide an indisputable proof that the simple conjunction of the Converse Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition yields a disastrous consequence.|
|Keywords||formal epistemology confirmation theory|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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