Action, control and sensations of acting

Philosophical Studies 124 (2):129-180 (2005)
Sensations of acting and control have been neglected in theory of action. I argue that they form the core of action and are integral and indispensible parts of our actions, participating as they do in feedback loops consisting of our intentions in acting, the bodily movements required for acting and the sensations of acting. These feedback loops underlie all activities in which we engage when we act and generate our control over our movements.The events required for action according to the causal theory, or Searle
Keywords Action  Agency  Control  Metaphysics  Sensation
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DOI 10.2307/4321600
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References found in this work BETA
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Joshua Shepherd (2014). The Contours of Control. Philosophical Studies 170 (3):395-411.
Tim Bayne (2008). The Phenomenology of Agency. Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.
Masahiro Yamada (2012). Taking Aim at the Truth. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59.

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