Epistemology Formalized

Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43 (2013)
Abstract
This paper argues that just as full beliefs can constitute knowledge, so can properties of your credence distribution. The resulting notion of probabilistic knowledge helps us give a natural account of knowledge ascriptions embedding language of subjective uncertainty, and a simple diagnosis of probabilistic analogs of Gettier cases. Just like propositional knowledge, probabilistic knowledge is factive, safe, and sensitive. And it helps us build knowledge-based norms of action without accepting implausible semantic assumptions or endorsing the claim that knowledge is interest-relative.
Keywords probabilistic knowledge  epistemic modals  factivity  interest relativity
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Seth Yalcin (2012). A Counterexample to Modus Tollens. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):1001-1024.
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    Stephen Schiffer (2007). Interest-Relative Invariantism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):188 - 195.
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