Physicalism and global supervenience

Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):71-82 (1992)
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Abstract

This paper examines a nonreductive supervenience relation central to a philosophically popular version of nonreductive physicalism inspired by Donald Davidson. The paper argues that this global supervenience relation faces a serious epistemological problem that blocks its being superior to weaker, less general supervenience relations

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Paul K. Moser
Loyola University, Chicago

Citations of this work

Naturalism, Reduction and Normativity: Pressing from Below.John F. Post - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):1-27.
Naturalism, reduction and normativity: Pressing from below.John F. Post - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):1–27.
Naturalism and psychological explanation.Paul K. Moser - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):63-84.
A Priori Arguments for Reductionism.Jennifer Rea Susse - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst

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