David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):503 - 535 (2006)
Plato links pleasure with illusion, and this link explains his rejection of the view that all desires are rational desires for the good. The Protagoras and Gorgias show connections between pleasure and illusion; the Republic develops these into a psychological theory. One part of the soul is not only prone to illusions, but also incapable of the kind of reasoning that can dispel them. Pleasure appears good; therefore this part of the soul (the appetitive part) desires pleasures qua good but ignores reasoning about what is really good. Hence the new moral psychology of the Republic: not all desires are rational, and thus virtue depends on bringing one's non-rational desires under the control of reason
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Citations of this work BETA
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2014). I—The Third Horse: On Unendorsed Association and Human Behaviour. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):185-218.
Rachel Barney (2010). Gorgias' Defense: Plato and His Opponents on Rhetoric and the Good. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):95-121.
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2014). I—Tamar Szabó Gendler: The Third Horse: On Unendorsed Association and Human Behaviour. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):185-218.
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