David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 120 (480):1053-1069 (2011)
It is commonly assumed that when we assign different credences to a proposition, a perfect compromise between our opinions simply ‘splits the difference’ between our credences. I introduce and defend an alternative account, namely that a perfect compromise maximizes the average of the expected epistemic values that we each assign to alternative credences in the disputed proposition. I compare the compromise strategy I introduce with the traditional strategy of compromising by splitting the difference, and I argue that my strategy is a reasonable characterization of epistemic compromise
|Keywords||disagreement scoring rule compromise|
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References found in this work BETA
David Christensen (2007). Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News. Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Hilary Greaves & David Wallace (2006). Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility. Mind 115 (459):607-632.
Graham Oddie (1997). Conditionalization, Cogency, and Cognitive Value. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4):533-541.
Citations of this work BETA
Sophie Horowitz (2013). Immoderately Rational. Philosophical Studies 167 (1):1-16.
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