David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Phronesis 56 (3):204-261 (2011)
Aristotle repeatedly claims that character-virtue “makes the goal right“, while Phronesis is responsible for working out how to achieve the goal. Many argue that these claims are misleading: it must be intellect that tells us what ends to pursue. I argue that Aristotle means just what he seems to say: despite putative textual evidence to the contrary, virtue is (a) a wholly non-intellectual state, and (b) responsible for literally supplying the contents of our goals. Furthermore, there are no good textual or philosophical reasons to reject this straightforward interpretation. Contrary to widespread opinion, Aristotle does not characterize Phronesis as supplying ends. Instead, its ethical import lies wholly in its ability to “determine the mean“. Moreover, because character involves non-rational cognition of the end as good, Aristotle can restrict practical intellect to deliberation without abandoning his anti-Humean view that we desire our ends because we find them good
|Keywords||Practical reason Aristotle Virtue Character Phronesis|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Jessica Moss (2014). Right Reason in Plato and Aristotle: On the Meaning of Logos. Phronesis 59 (3):181-230.
Similar books and articles
Xianzhong Huang (2007). Justice as a Virtue: An Analysis of Aristotle's Virtue of Justice. [REVIEW] Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (2):265-279.
Jason Baehr (2006). Character, Reliability and Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):193–212.
Marguerite Deslauriers (2002). How to Distinguish Aristotle's Virtues. Phronesis 47 (2):101 - 126.
Marguerite Deslauriers (2002). How to Distinguish Aristotle's Virtues. Phronesis 47 (2):101-126.
Julia Driver (2001). Uneasy Virtue. Cambridge University Press.
Jason Brennan (2007). Modesty Without Illusion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):111–128.
Jason Brennan (2007). Modesty Without Illusion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):111-128.
Marcia L. Homiak (2000). Does Hume Have an Ethics of Virtue? The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 7:191-200.
Matt Stichter (2007). Ethical Expertise: The Skill Model of Virtue. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2):183 - 194.
Jonathan J. Sanford (2006). Aristotle’s Divided Mind: Some Thoughts on Intellectual Virtue and Aristotle’s Occasional Dualism. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:77-90.
Lara Denis (2006). Kant's Conception of Virtue. In Paul Guyer (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy. Cambridge University Press
Amélie Rorty (2011). Aristotle on the Virtues of Rhetoric. Review of Metaphysics 64 (4):715-733.
Added to index2011-07-07
Total downloads141 ( #26,197 of 1,902,049 )
Recent downloads (6 months)20 ( #36,328 of 1,902,049 )
How can I increase my downloads?