David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1/3):55 - 69 (2008)
This article defends a regulative ethics of voluntary belief. In order to determine the occasion and the scope of such an ethics, the article begins with an examination of the concept of belief in conversation with the view of J. L. Schellenberg. Next, against the dominant position in contemporary epistemology, it argues that some beliefs can be voluntary, in the sense that they are under the immediate control of the believer, and replies to William Alston's influential objections to doxastic voluntarism. If some beliefs are subject to the immediate control of the believer, then in these cases believers are ethically responsible not only for how they investigate those beliefs, but also for the choice of whether or not to believe them. The article concludes by formulating and defending two types of regulative ethical principles governing voluntary belief
|Keywords||Belief Ethics William Alston J. L. Schellenberg Doxastic voluntarism Evidentialism Faith Self-deception|
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References found in this work BETA
William P. Alston (1991). Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Cornell University Press.
William P. Alston (1988). The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.
Karl-Otto Apel (1998). From a Transcendental-Semiotic Point of View. Distributed Exclusively in the Usa by St. Martin's Press.
L. Jonathan Cohen (1989). Belief and Acceptance. Mind 98 (391):367-389.
Richard Feldman (2000). The Ethics of Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.
Citations of this work BETA
Rik Peels (2013). Belief-Policies Cannot Ground Doxastic Responsibility. Erkenntnis 78 (3):561-569.
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