David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2001:19-27 (2001)
Ontology should be conceived as supervenient on scientific theories. They tell us what categories of things there really are. Thus, we would have a unique system of ontology if we would attain the unity of science through a reductionist program. For this, it should be clear how a relation of intertheoretical reduction (with ontological implications) is to be conceived. A formal proposal is laid out in this paper. This allows us also to define the notion of a fundamental theory. Now, it appears that, considering the state of really existing science, the idea of reductionism as based on this explication is highly implausible. However, even if this is the case, the question whether it is possible to build up a unique ontological system remains open. Its resolution depends on the notion of compatibility between fundamental theories, and its application to existing theories and their empirical bases
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Stéphanie Ruphy (2006). Ontology Relativized: Reply to Moulines. Synthese 151 (3):325 - 330.
C. Ulises Moulines (2006). Ontology, Reduction, Emergence: A General Frame. Synthese 151 (3):313-323.
William P. Bechtel & Andrew Hamilton (2007). Reduction, Integration, and the Unity of Science: Natural, Behavioral, and Social Sciences and the Humanities. In T. Kuipers (ed.), Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues (Volume 1 of the Handbook of the Philosophy of Science). Elsevier.
Margaret Morrison (1994). Unified Theories and Disparate Things. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:365 - 373.
Jonas R. B. Arenhart (2012). Ontological Frameworks for Scientific Theories. Foundations of Science 17 (4):339-356.
Martin Carrier & Jürgen Mittelstrass (1990). The Unity of Science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (1):17-31.
Marcin Miłkowski (2008). Definining Ontological Naturalism. In Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences. Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Fritz Rohrlich (1988). Pluralistic Ontology and Theory Reduction in the Physical Sciences. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (3):295-312.
Angela Potochnik (2011). A Neurathian Conception of the Unity of Science. Erkenntnis 74 (3):305-319.
G. Hellman & F. Thomson (1975). Physicalism: Ontology, Determination and Reduction. Journal of Philosophy 72 (October):551-64.
Ronald Loeffler (2005). Intertheoretical Identity and Ontological Reductions. Erkenntnis 62 (2):157 - 187.
Emma Ruttkamp & Johannes Heidema (2005). Reviewing Reduction in a Preferential Model-Theoretic Context. [REVIEW] International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):123 – 146.
Sahotra Sarkar (1992). Models of Reduction and Categories of Reductionism. Synthese 91 (3):167-94.
Todd A. Grantham (2004). Conceptualizing the (Dis)Unity of Science. Philosophy of Science 71 (2):133-155.
Daniel A. Bonevac (1988). Supervenience and Ontology. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (January):37-47.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads15 ( #106,784 of 1,099,016 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #114,795 of 1,099,016 )
How can I increase my downloads?