Winch and Anscombe on Ethics and Religion

Philosophical Investigations 34 (3):241-248 (2011)
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to consider in detail a paper in which Peter Winch discusses the absolute nature of the moral ought. Anscombe had argued that the notion of an absolute ought presupposes the idea of divine law. Winch's aim is to show her mistaken. On his view, it is the idea of divine that depends on the notion of an absolute ought.It is argued that Winch is not successful in his criticism. Indeed, were we to accept his assumptions, we should be forced to conclude that the moral ought is not absolute at all, but relative
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