|Abstract||In this paper, I want to defend the proposal that one has to be a realist about the existence and causal efficacy of reasons if one wants to have rationally justified actions. On this basis, I will propose to understand intentional action in terms of justification alone, not in terms of justification plus causation. I shall argue that an action is intentional, under a certain description, if, and only if, it is justified, under that description, by the agent’s reasons. The proposal recommends itself as being capable of solving the problem of wayward causal chains and is promising as a way of avoiding epiphenomenalism of mental properties|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Carlos J. Moya (1998). Justificación, Causalidad Y Acción Intencional (Justification, Causality and Intentional Action). Theoria 13 (2):349-365.
John M. Connolly (1991). Whither Action Theory. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:85-106.
Rebekah L. H. Rice (2011). Agent Causation and Acting for Reasons. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):333-346.
Yair Levy (2013). Intentional Action First. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.
Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser (1994). Intentional Action. Noûs 28 (1):39-68.
Robert K. Shope (1991). Non-Deviant Causal Chains. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:251-291.
Zhu Xu (2010). Laws, Causality and the Intentional Explanation of Action. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (2):280-293.
Christopher Yeomans (2010). Hegel and Analytic Philosophy of Action. The Owl of Minerva 42 (1-2):41-62.
Mark Risjord (2005). Reasons, Causes, and Action Explanation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (3):294-306.
Sarah K. Paul (2011). Deviant Formal Causation. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3).
Joshua Shepherd (forthcoming). Causalism and Intentional Omission. American Philosophical Quarterly.
L. S. Carrier (1986). Free Will and Intentional Action. Philosophia 16 (December):355-364.
Frank Hindriks (2011). Control, Intentional Action, and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):787 - 801.
Added to index2012-03-18
Total downloads5 ( #169,891 of 722,764 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,764 )
How can I increase my downloads?