David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 141 (3):299 - 322 (2008)
The fission of a person involves what common sense describes as a single person surviving as two distinct people. Thus, say most metaphysicians, this paradox shows us that common sense is inconsistent with the transitivity of identity. Lewis’s theory of overlapping persons, buttressed with tensed identity, gives us one way to reconcile the common sense claims. Lewis’s account, however, implausibly says that reference to a person about to undergo fission is ambiguous. A better way to reconcile the claims of common sense, one that avoids this ambiguity, is to recognize branching persons, persons who have multiple pasts or futures.
|Keywords||Metaphysics Fission Personal identity Tensed identity Four-dimensionalism Temporal parts theory|
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Citations of this work BETA
Simon Langford & Murali Ramachandran (2011). Occasional Identity: A Tale of Two Approaches. Analytic Philosophy 52 (3):175-187.
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