David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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We are strongly inclined to believe in moral responsibility, that some human agents truly deserve moral praise or blame for some of their actions. However, recent philosophical discussion has put this natural belief in the reality of moral responsibility under suspicion. There are important reasons to think that moral responsibility is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, possibly rendering moral responsibility an impossibility. This book lays out the major arguments for skepticism about moral responsibility and subjects them to sustained and penetrating critical analysis. Moral Responsibility lays out the intricate dialectic involved in these issues in a helpful and accessible way. The book goes on to suggest a way in which skepticism can be avoided, arguing that an excessive pre-eminence given to the will might lie at the root of skepticism of moral responsibility. Carlos Moya offers an alternative to skepticism, showing how a cognitive approach to moral responsibility which stresses the importance of belief would rescue our natural and centrally important faith in the reality of moral responsibility
|Keywords||Responsibility Skepticism Free will and determinism|
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|Buy the book||$31.99 used (36% off) $39.77 new (21% off) $47.45 direct from Amazon (6% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BJ1451.M69 2005|
|ISBN(s)||0415591686 0415371953 9780415371957|
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Josep E. Corbí (2010). First-Person Authority and Self-Knowledge as an Achievement. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):325-362.
Derk Pereboom (2009). Further Thoughts About a Frankfurt-Style Argument. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118.
Nadine Elzein (2013). Pereboom's Frankfurt Case and Derivative Culpability. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):553-573.
Derk Pereboom (2012). Frankfurt Examples, Derivative Responsibility, and the Timing Objection1. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):298-315.
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