Reason and Causation in Davidson's Theory of Action Explanation

Critica 30 (89):29 - 43 (1998)
En la concepcion de Davidson, las explicaciones de la accion en terminos de razones incluyen dos aspectos o condiciones independientes entre si: una condicion de racionalidad o justificacion racional y una condicion causal. La satisfaccion de la primera depende de relaciones logicas apropiadas entre las descripciones de la razon y de la accion. La segunda exige unicamente la existencia de un vinculo causal entre razon y accion. Es esta independencia entre las dos condiciones la que, en nuestra opinion, genera en la teoria davidsoniana los problemas de las cadenas causales desviadas y del epifenomenismo de las propiedades mentales. (edited)
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