David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Palgrave Macmillan (2004)
This radical reading of Wittgenstein's third and last masterpiece, On Certainty, has major implications for philosophy. It elucidates Wittgenstein's ultimate thoughts on the nature of our basic beliefs and his demystification of scepticism. Our basic certainties are shown to be nonepistemic, nonpropositional attitudes that, as such, have no verbal occurrence but manifest themselves exclusively in our actions. This fundamental certainty is a belief-in, a primitive confidence or ur-trust whose practical nature bridges the hitherto unresolved categorial gap between belief and action.
|Keywords||Certainty belief-in trust Wittgenstein basic beliefs scepticism 'hinge propositions' 'third Wittgenstein'|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$45.79 used (69% off) $96.95 new (29% off) $120.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||B3376.W563.U365 2004|
|ISBN(s)||9781403921758 140392175X 1403944490|
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Duncan Pritchard (2012). Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Synthese 189 (2):255-272.
Annalisa Coliva (2010). Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist? Philosophical Investigations 33 (1):1-23.
Scott Scheall (2011). Later Wittgenstein and the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophical Investigations 34 (3):268-286.
Daniel D. Hutto (2009). Philosophical Clarification, its Possibility and Point. Philosophia 37 (4):629–652.
Annalisa Coliva (2013). Hinges and Certainty. A Précis of Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. Philosophia 41 (1):1-12.
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