Words as deeds: Wittgenstein's ''spontaneous utterances'' and the dissolution of the explanatory gap
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):355 – 372 (2000)
Wittgenstein demystified the notion of 'observational self-knowledge'. He dislodged the long-standing conception that we have privileged access to our impressions, sensations and feelings through introspection, and more precisely eliminated knowing as the kind of awareness that normally characterizes our first-person present-tense psychological statements. He was not thereby questioning our awareness of our emotions or sensations, but debunking the notion that we come to that awareness via any epistemic route. This makes the spontaneous linguistic articulation of our sensations and impressions nondescriptive. Not descriptions, but expressions that seem more akin to behaviour than to language. I suggest that Wittgenstein uncovered a new species of speech acts. Far from the prearranged consecration of words into performatives, utterances are deeds through their very spontaneity. This gives language a new aura: the aura of the reflex action. I argue, against Peter Hacker, that spontaneous utterances have the categorial status of deeds. This has no reductive consequences in that I do not suggest that one category is reduced to another, but that the boundary between them is porous. This explodes the myth of an explanatory gap between the traditionally distinct categories of saying (or thinking) and doing, or of mind and body.
|Keywords||speech-act self-knowledge performative philosophy of action body-mind problem|
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References found in this work BETA
Gilbert Ryle (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1969). On Certainty (Ed. Anscombe and von Wright). Harper Torchbooks.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1980). Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Basil Blackwell.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alfred Nordmann & James Carl Klagge (1993). Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
Citations of this work BETA
Gavin B. Sullivan & Kenneth T. Strongman (2003). Vacillating and Mixed Emotions: A Conceptual-Discursive Perspective on Contemporary Emotion and Cognitive Appraisal Theories Through Examples of Pride. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 33 (2):203–226.
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