A tenseless account of the presence of experience

Philosophical Studies 129 (3):441 - 476 (2006)
Tenseless theories of time entail that the only temporal properties exemplified by events are earlier than, simultaneous with, and later than. Such an account seems to conflict with our common experience of time, which suggests that the present moment is ontologically unique and that time flows. Some have argued that only a tensed account of time, one in which past, present and future are objective properties, can do justice to our experience. Any theory that claims that the world is different from how we experience it must nonetheless be consistent with the having of that experience. Accordingly, in this essay I defend the tenseless theory by arguing that it can indeed account for certain key features of our experience of time without recourse to tensed properties.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/4321771
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,879
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Craig Callender (2008). The Common Now. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):339-361.
Stephan Torre (2010). Tense, Timely Action and Self-Ascription. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):112-132.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Heather Dyke (2003). Temporal Language and Temporal Reality. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):380–391.
Roman Altshuler (2009). Agency and the A-Series. Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):153-161.
William Lane Craig (2001). Wishing It Were Now Some Other Time. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):159-166.
James Wetzel (1995). Time After Augustine. Religious Studies 31 (3):341 - 357.
Quentin Smith (1987). Sentences About Time. Philosophical Quarterly 37 (146):37-53.
L. Nathan Oaklander (1993). On the Experience of Tenseless Time. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:159-166.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

94 ( #28,614 of 1,725,176 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #93,181 of 1,725,176 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.