Tense and temporal semantics
Synthese 124 (2):257-279 (2000)
| Abstract | Tenseless theories of time entail that earlierthan, later than and simultaneous with (i.e.,McTaggart's `B-series') are the only temporalproperties exemplified by events. Such theories oftencome under attack for being unable to satisfactorilyaccount for tensed language. In this essay I arguethat tenseless theories of time are capable of twofeats that critics, such as Quentin Smith, argue arebeyond their grasp: (1) They can coherently explainthe impossibility of translating all tensed sentencesby tenseless counterparts; (2) They can account forcertain obviously valid entailment relations betweentensed sentence types. In analyzing tensed entailmentrelations tenselessly, I favor a date analysis oftensed language over a token-reflexive theory. Theupshot is that tenseless theories of time are notundermined by the linguistic facts. | |||||||||
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Lisa Matthewson (2006). Temporal Semantics in a Superficially Tenseless Language. Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (6):673 - 713.
Heather Dyke (2001). The Pervasive Paradox of Tense. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):103-124.
William Lane Craig (2001). Wishing It Were Now Some Other Time. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):159-166.
Judith Tonhauser (2011). Temporal Reference in Paraguayan GuaranĂ, a Tenseless Language. Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (3):257-303.
William Lane Craig (1999). Temporal Becoming and the Direction of Time. Philosophy and Theology 11 (2):349-366.
Thomas Baldwin (1999). Back to the Present. Philosophy 74 (2):177-197.
L. A. Paul (1997). Truth Conditions of Tensed Sentence Types. Synthese 111 (1):53-72.
Heather Dyke (2003). Temporal Language and Temporal Reality. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):380–391.
J. M. Mozersky (2006). A Tenseless Account of the Presence of Experience. Philosophical Studies 129 (3):441 - 476.
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