David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Erkenntnis 48 (1):81 - 99 (1998)
Quine claims that holism (i.e., the Quine-Duhem thesis) prevents us from defining synonymy and analyticity (section 2). In "Word and Object," he dismisses a notion of synonymy which works well even if holism is true. The notion goes back to a proposal from Grice and Strawson and runs thus: R and S are synonymous iff for all sentences T we have that the logical conjunction of R and T is stimulus-synonymous to that of S and T. Whereas Grice and Strawson did not attempt to defend this definition, I try to show that it indeed gives us a satisfactory account of synonymy. Contrary to Quine, the notion is tighter than stimulus-synonymy -- particularly when applied to sentences with less than critical semantic mass (section 3). Now according to Quine, analyticity could be defined in terms of synonymy, if synonymy were to make sense: A sentence is analytic iff synonymous to self-conditionals. This leads us to the following notion of analyticity: S is analytic iff, for all sentences T, the logical conjunction of S and T is stimulus-synonymous to T; an analytic sentence does not change the semantic mass of any theory to which it may be conjoined (section 4). This notion is tighter than Quine's stimulus-analyticity; unlike stimulus-analyticity, it does not apply to those sentences from the very center of our theories which can be assented to come what may, even though they are not synthetic in the intuitive sense (section 5).
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Olaf Mueller (1998). Does the Quine/Duhem Thesis Prevent Us From Defining Analyticity? Erkenntnis 48 (1):85-104.
Peter Pagin (2001). A Quinean Definition of Synonymy. Erkenntnis 55 (1):7-32.
Marian David (1996). Analyticity, Carnap, Quine, and Truth. Philosophical Perspectives 10:281 - 296.
Olaf L. Müller (2002). From Within and From Without. Two Perspectives on Analytic Sentences. In Wolfram Hinzen & Hans Rott (eds.), Belief and meaning: Essays at the interface. Deutsche Bibliothek der Wissenschaften
Paul Artin Boghossian (1996). Analyticity Reconsidered. Noûs 30 (3):360-391.
Cory Juhl (2009). Analyticity. Routledge.
Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (2001). Boghossian on Analyticity. Analysis 61 (4):293–302.
Reese M. Heitner (2006). From a Phono-Logical Point of View: Neutralizing Quine's Argument Against Analyticity. Synthese 150 (1):15-39.
Verena Mayer (2003). Implicit Thoughts: Quine, Frege and Kant on Analytic Propositions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):61-90.
John P. Burgess (2004). Quine, Analyticity and Philosophy of Mathematics. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):38–55.
Donald Hockney (1975). The Bifurcation of Scientific Theories and Indeterminacy of Translation. Philosophy of Science 42 (4):411-427.
Gillian Kay Russell (2004). Analyticity, Meaning and Paradox. Dissertation, Princeton University
Richard Creath (1991). Every Dogma has its Day. Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):347-389.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads24 ( #152,961 of 1,790,533 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #94,635 of 1,790,533 )
How can I increase my downloads?