David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):59-82 (2003)
This article defends the thesis that Putnam's theory of the use of empirical concepts constitutes a continuous backbone of his philosophy early and late. Thus, Putnam's theory of empirical concepts should be at least compatible with the most distinctive features of both, his realism (viz., semantic externalism) and his pragmatism (viz., conceptual pluralism). The article suggests the even stronger thesis that Putnam's theory of concepts is essential for the explanatory purposes of both. In doing so, the article proposes reading Putnam's theory as a theory displaying contextual features of language use rather than as one describing metaphysical, epistemic, or cognitional 'underpinnings'. The theory's continuity is thus taken to show that Putnam's realism and pragmatism are and always have been inseparable.
|Keywords||Semantic Externalism Reference Conceptual Relativism Putnam, Hilary Ontological Relativity Pragmatics|
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References found in this work BETA
Hilary Putnam (1975). Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University Press.
Hilary Putnam (1962). It Ain't Necessarily So. Journal of Philosophy 59 (22):658-671.
Jennifer Case (1997). On the Right Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):1-18.
Hilary Putnam (1967). The Analytic and the Synthetic. Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 1 (2):109-113.
Hilary Putnam (1994). Comments and Replies. In Peter Clark & Bob Hale (eds.), Reading Putnam. Blackwell 242--95.
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