|Abstract||This article defends the thesis that Putnam’s theory of the use of empirical concepts constitutes a continuous backbone of his philosophy early and late. Thus, Putnam’s theory of empirical concepts should be at least compatible with the most distinctive features of both, his realism (viz., semantic externalism) and his pragmatism (viz., conceptual pluralism). The article suggests the even stronger thesis that Putnam’s theory of concepts is essential for the explanatory purposes of both. In doing so, the article proposes reading Putnam’s theory as a theory displaying contextual features of language use rather than as one describing metaphysical, epistemic, or cognitional ‘underpinnings’. The theory’s continuity is thus taken to show that Putnam’s realism and pragmatism are and always have been inseparable.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Amir Horowitz (1995). Putnam, Searle, and Externalism. Philosophical Studies 81 (1):27-69.
D. C. Smith (2003). What is so Magical About a Theory of Intrinsic Intentionality? Philosophical Papers 32 (1):83-96.
Victoria S. Harrison (2006). Internal Realism and the Problem of Religious Diversity. Philosophia 34 (3):287-301.
Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2002). Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism. Noûs 36 (s1):74 - 96.
Carleton B. Christensen (2001). Escape From Twin Earth: Putnam's 'Logic' of Natural Kind Terms. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2):123-150.
Panu Raatikainen (2010). The Semantic Realism/Anti-Realism Dispute and Knowledge of Meanings. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5:1-13.
Daniel A. Weiskopf (2007). Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.
Ernest Sosa (1993). Abilities, Concepts, and Externalism. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
Anders Öberg (2011). Hilary Putnam on Meaning and Necessity. Dissertation, Uppsala University
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads6 ( #145,546 of 549,067 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,067 )
How can I increase my downloads?