Explanatory Unification and Scientific Understanding

Acta Philosophica 20 (2):383 - 404 (2011)
This paper represents a response to the criticisms made by Eric Barnes in “Explanatory Unification and the Problem of Asymmetry” and “Explanatory Unification and Scientific Understanding” against the thesis of Explanatory Unification. This paper responds to Barnes‟ two main criticisms, that of derivational skepticism and causal asymmetry, and successfully refutes his objections. This paper also defends the plausibility of the unificationist account of scientific explanation because of its ability to render coherent the notion of scientific understanding, focusing in particular on the work by Michael Friedman and Philip Kitcher.
Keywords philosophy of science  explanatory unification
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Eric Barnes (1992). Explanatory Unification and Scientific Understanding. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:3 - 12.
Uskali Mäki (2001). Explanatory Unification: Double and Doubtful. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 31 (4):488-506.
Eric Barnes (1994). Explaining Brute Facts. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:61-68.
Anya Plutynski (2005). Explanatory Unification and the Early Synthesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):595-609.

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