Future People: A Moderate Consequentialist Account of Our Obligations to Future Generations

Oxford University Press (2006)
Abstract
What do we owe to our descendants? How do we balance their needs against our own? Tim Mulgan develops a new theory of our obligations to future generations, based on a new rule-consequentialist account of the morality of individual reproduction. He also brings together several different contemporary philosophical discussions, including the demands of morality and international justice. His aim is to produce a coherent, intuitively plausible moral theory that is not unreasonably demanding, even when extended to cover future people. While the book focuses on developing this new account, there are also substantial discussions of alternative views, especially contract-based accounts of intergenerational justice and competing forms of consequentialism.
Keywords Duty  Consequentialism (Ethics
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Reprint years 2008
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Call number BJ1451.M79 2006
ISBN(s) 0199556733   019928220X   9780199282203     9780199556731
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Robert Audi (2008). Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):475 - 492.

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