David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
The distinctive claim of the Gestalt psychologists (of Prague, Graz, Berlin, Leipzig, and Vienna) is that we are typically aware of wholes which have “Gestalt qualities”, such as being a melody, and that these qualities could not be properties of mere sums, for example of sums of tones. A common, stronger claim is that the wholes we are aware of are themselves “Gestalten”, the parts of which are inseparable from each other and from the wholes they belong to. The Gestalt psychologists took themselves to be opposing associationistic and atomistic assumptions in psychology. The notion of a Gestalt is applied primarily in their accounts of perception and to a much lesser extent in their accounts of feelings (Gefühle), aesthetic and non-aesthetic, of their objects, of our awareness of the feelings of others, of our attributions of emotions, of our grasp of value and of the relations between affective phenomena and perception.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2013). Gestalt, Equivalency, and Functional Dependency. Kurt Grelling’s Formal Ontology. In Nikolay Milkov & Volker Peckhaus (eds.), The Berlin Group and the Philosophy of Logical Empiricism. Springer 245--261.
Gaetano Kanizsa (1994). Gestalt Theory has Been Misinterpreted, but has Had Some Real Conceptual Difficulties. Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):149-162.
William M. Epstein & Gary Hatfield (1994). Gestalt Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):163-181.
Edmond Wright, Perception as Epistemic: 'We Perceive Only What We Have Motivationally Selected as Entities'.
Barry Smith (1988). Gestalt Theory: An Essay in Philosophy. In Foundations of Gestalt Theory. Philosophia 11-81.
Philip Brownell (2004). Perceiving You Perceiving Me: Self-Conscious Emotions and Gestalt Therapy. Gestalt! 8 (1).
Alf C. Zimmer & Hermann Korndle (1994). A Gestalt Theoretic Account for the Coordination of Perception and Action in Motor Learning. Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):249-265.
David W. Hamlyn (1957). The Psychology Of Perception: A Philosophical Examination Of Gestalt Theory And Derivative Theories Of Perception. The Humanities Press.
Cees van Leeuwen & John Stins (1994). Perceivable Information Or: The Happy Marriage Between Ecological Psychology and Gestalt. Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):267-285.
Fredrik Sundqvist (2003). Perceptual Dynamics: Theoretical Foundations and Philosophical Implications of Gestalt Psychology (Acta Philosophica Gothoburgensia 16). GÃ¶Teborg: Acta Philosophica Gothoburgensia.
D. H. J. Warner (1964). Resemblance and Gestalt Psychology. Analysis 24 (June):196-200.
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads47 ( #96,017 of 1,938,822 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #294,284 of 1,938,822 )
How can I increase my downloads?