Graduate studies at Western
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (2):123-139 (1999)
|Abstract||The view that psychological episodes have a physical nature (physicalism) and the view that they have a mental nature (Cartesian dualism) can be distinguished from the view that they have a purely normative nature. I explore some strands of a distinct, fourth view: psychological episodes are what they are because of the actual and possible relations of defeasible justification in which they stand; defeasible justification is an internal relation; it is not at bottom a normative matter; rule-following presupposes such internal relations; to follow a rule is not to break it|
|Keywords||Dualism Epistemology Mind Physicalism Rule|
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