Materialism and the "problem" of quantum measurement

Minds and Machines 5 (2):207-17 (1995)
  For nearly six decades, the conscious observer has played a central and essential rôle in quantum measurement theory. I outline some difficulties which the traditional account of measurement presents for material theories of mind before introducing a new development which promises to exorcise the ghost of consciousness from physics and relieve the cognitive scientist of the burden of explaining why certain material structures reduce wavefunctions by virtue of being conscious while others do not. The interactive decoherence of complex quantum systems reveals that the oddities and complexities of linear superposition and state vector reduction are irrelevant to computational aspects of the philosophy of mind and that many conclusions in related fields are ill founded
Keywords Artificial Intelligence  Materialism  Quantum Mechanics  Science  Subjectivity
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DOI 10.1007/BF00974744
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Gregory R. Mulhauser (forthcoming). What is It Like to Be Nagel?'. Philosopher: Journal of the Philosophical Society of England.

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