Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (4):627 - 644 (1985)
Franz Brentano’s ‘philosophy of mind’ still means, as far as most philosophers are concerned, no more than a peculiarly influential account of intentionality. In fact, in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano has provided an account of mental phenomena which ranks with any to be found in the literature of philosophy. It differs as much from the conceptcentered Kantian approaches to ‘reason’ or ‘understanding’ as from more recent approaches, centered on the language used to report or to express ’propositional attitudes’, in being an ontology of mind, concerned with the description of the entities which are involved in mental experience and of the relations between them. With the posthumous publication of a series of lectures given in Vienna in 1890-1911 we now possess a clear account of the ontology, and of the methods, underlying Brentano’s numerous and subtle descriptions of mental phenomena, at least at one highly fruitful stage in his career. What follows is a detailed exposition of this work, together with a brief critical coda.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski & Barry Smith (2004). Brentano’s Ontology: From Conceptualism to Reism. In Dale Jacquette (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Cambridge University Press. 197--220.
Linda L. McAlister (ed.) (1977). The Philosophy of Brentano. Humanities Press.
Roderick M. Chisholm (1986). Brentano and Intrinsic Value. Cambridge University Press.
Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Brentano's Concept of Mind: Underlying Nature, Reference-Fixing, and the Mark of the Mental. In Sandra Lapointe & Christopher Pincock (eds.), Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy. Palgrave-Macmillan.
Robin Rollinger (2005). Meinong and Brentano. Meinong Studies 1:159-198.
Barry Smith (1989). The Primacy of Place: An Investigation in Brentanian Ontology. Topoi 8 (1):43-51.
Napoleon M. Mabaquiao (2005). Husserl's Theory of Intentionality. Philosophia 34 (1):24-49.
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2003). Brentano's Late Ontology. Brentano Studien 10:221-236.
Tim Crane (2006). Brentano's Concept of Intentional Inexistence. In Mark Textor (ed.), The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy. Routledge. 1--20.
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2001). Die Intentionalitätstheorie Anton Martys. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):175-214.
Ryan Hickerson (2007). The History of Intentionality: Theories of Consciousness From Brentano to Husserl. Continuum.
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (1999). Die Theorie des Zeitbewußtseins Franz Brentanos Aufgrund der Unpublizierten Manuskripte. Brentano Studien 8:149-161.
Mark Textor (2013). Brentano on the Dual Relation of the Mental. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):465-483.
Wolfgang Huemer & Christoph Landerer (2010). Mathematics, Experience, and Laboratories: Herbart's and Brentano's Role in the Rise of Scientific Psychology. History of the Human Sciences 23 (3):72-94.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads14 ( #120,617 of 1,102,071 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #52,509 of 1,102,071 )
How can I increase my downloads?