Robust simulations

Philosophy of Science 74 (5):873-883 (2007)
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Abstract

As scientists begin to study increasingly complex questions, many have turned to computer simulation to assist in their inquiry. This methodology has been challenged by both analytic modelers and experimentalists. A primary objection of analytic modelers is that simulations are simply too complicated to perform model verification. From the experimentalist perspective it is that there is no means to demonstrate the reality of simulation. The aim of this paper is to consider objections from both of these perspectives, and to argue that a proper understanding and application of robustness analysis is able to resolve them. ‡The author would like to thank Cristina Bicchieri, Michelle Foa, Paul Humphreys and Michael Weisberg for their helpful comments and suggestions. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, 433 Logan Hall, 249 S. 36th Street, Philadelphia, PA, 19104-6304; e-mail: [email protected].

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Ryan Muldoon
University at Buffalo

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References found in this work

Do We See Through a Microscope?Ian Hacking - 1981 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (4):305-322.
Real realism: The galilean strategy.Philip Kitcher - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):151-197.
Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy.Philip Kitcher - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):151.

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