British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):61-99 (2005)
|Abstract||We propose a rigourous criterion for observability and claim it solves three problems that extant accounts of observability, including Van Fraassen's one, do not solve. We also give a rigourous verions of Van Fraassen's own sketchy account of modality without relying on `inflationary metaphycis'.|
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