Journal of Philosophical Research 36:371-389 (2011)
|Abstract||We defend the view that belief is a psychological category against a recent attempt to recast it as a normative one. Tamar Gendler has argued that to properly understand how beliefs function in the regulation and production of action, we need to contrast beliefs with a class of psychological states and processes she calls “aliefs.” We agree with Gendler that affective states as well as habits and instincts deserve more attention than they receive in the contemporary philosophical psychology literature. But we argue that it is a serious error to align beliefs with the norm of rationality, while building a contrasting category whose members are characterized primarily by their failure to measure up to that normative standard, since these latter ones cannot constitute a distinct psychological category. First, we demonstrate that Gendler gets unwarranted conclusions about the existence of aliefs from belief-discordant cases. Next, we argue that the concept of alief is insufficiently clear. Aliefs cannot be distinguished from other types of states, such as beliefs. Also, when grouping many states under the category of aliefs, Gendler overlooks important differences between phenomena that are clearly distinct, such as habits and instincts. Aliefs simply do not constitute a legitimate psychological category|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Eric Mandelbaum (2013). Against Alief. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):197-211.
Uriah Kriegel (2012). Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, And The Alief/Belief Distinction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):469-486.
Michael Brownstein & Alex Madva (2012). The Normativity of Automaticity. Mind and Language 27 (4):410-434.
Jack M. C. Kwong (2011). Resisting Aliefs: Gendler on Belief-Discordant Behaviors. Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):77 - 91.
Miri Albahari (forthcoming). Alief or Belief? A Contextual Approach to Belief Ascription. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
Matthew Haug (2011). Explaining the Placebo Effect: Aliefs, Beliefs, and Conditioning. Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):679 - 698.
Jennifer Nagel (2012). Gendler on Alief. [REVIEW] Analysis 72 (4):774-788.
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008). Alief in Action (and Reaction). Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585.
Thomas Dixon (2003). From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category. Cambridge University Press.
Paul E. Griffiths (2004). Is Emotion a Natural Kind? In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
Wayne A. Davis (2005). Reasons and Psychological Causes. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.
Jan Westerhoff (2002). Defining 'Ontological Category'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (3):287–293.
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008). Alief and Belief. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
Michael Smith (2003). Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):460–467.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads31 ( #44,779 of 722,764 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #20,343 of 722,764 )
How can I increase my downloads?