Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||One of the reasons provided for the shift away from an ontology, for physical reality, of material objects & properties towards one of physical structures & relations (Ontological Structural Realism: OntSR) is that the quantum-mechanical description of composite physical systems of similar elementary particles entails they are indiscernible. As material objects, they ‘whither away’. We inquire into the question whether recent results esta- blishing the weak discernibility of elementary particles pose a threat for this quantum-mechanical reason for OntSR, because precisely their discerni- bility prevents them from ‘whithering away’. We argue there is a straight- forward manner to consider the recent results as a reason for OntSR rather than against it. Finally we argue that the relativistic quantum ﬁeld provides an even better reason for OntSR.|
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