Intentionality and the physical: A new theory of disposition ascription

Philosophical Quarterly 50 (195):215-25 (1999)
Abstract
This paper has three aims. First, I aim to stress the importance of the issue of the dispositional/categorical distinction in the light of the evident failure of the traditional formulation, which is in terms of conditional entailment. Second, I consider one radical new alternative on offer from Ullin Place: intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. I explain the appeal of physical intentionality, but show it ultimately to be unacceptable. Finally, I suggest what would be a better theory. If we take disposition ascriptions to be functional characterizations of properties, then we can explain all that was appealing about the new alternative without the unacceptable consequences
Keywords Intentionality  Logic  Physicalism  Martin, C  Mellor, D H
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1997). Finkish Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.

View all 11 references

Citations of this work BETA
Jan Hauska (2008). In Defence of Causal Bases. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):23 – 43.
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