Putnam's Progress: Navigating between Strident Realism and Extreme Skepticism with a Wittgensteinian Chart, an Austinian Spyglass, and a Deweyan Compass

Metaphilosophy 32 (3):326-343 (2001)
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Keywords charity  belief attribution  supervenience  skepticism
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9973.00191
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Chris Tucker (2011). No Justified Higher-Level Belief, No Problem. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:283-290.

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