Transparency, Revelation and Sensory Knowledge. Gauging the Explananda to a Theory of Phenomenal Presence.
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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There are two arguments in contemporary philosophy of consciousness and perception with which every theory of sensory awareness and phenomenal presence must deal: the Argument from Transparency and the Argument from Revelation. The first one is about the intentionality of sensations or conscious sensory states and the second one is about their epistemic role. These both arguments depend, on the one hand, on specific interpretations of ‘transparency’ and ‘revelation’ and, on the other hand, on specifying the formal structures that they have. My main aim is to specify the conceptual conditions of conceivability of the explananda of a theory of phenomenal presence by analyzing transparency and revelation and their corresponding arguments. I will argue that we can arrive to neutral versions of the both arguments which do not depend on endorsing metaphysical theses about sensory content. From these versions of the arguments, I will show that to understand the relationships between them will give rise to a basic characterization of what must be explained by any theory of sensory phenomenal presence. My plan is as follows. In the first part I will present what I think to be the standard interpretations of the two arguments, their logical structures and the interpretations that I take to be the more neutral ones. Hence, I will offer an analysis of each one which allows us to identify some metaphysical and epistemological commitments of their interpretative alternatives. In the second part I will relate these arguments and I will make explicit their strongest relationships. I will present the working concepts of ‘transparent’ and ‘revealed’ and what I call the Transparency-Revelation Argument characterizing the explananda of a non-reductive theory of phenomenal presence. Such argument gives rise to three claims which will be presented as describing the basic explananda of a theory of sensory phenomenal presence. Finally, in the third section, I will sketch the main conclusions.
|Keywords||Transparency of Experience Revelation Phenomenal Presence Sensory States Phenomenal Intentionality Sensory Phenomenology Sensations Conscious Experiences Phenomenal Consciousness Phenomenal Absence|
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