Anti-luminosity: Four unsuccessful strategies

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):659-673 (2009)
In KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS Timothy Williamson argues against the luminosity of phenomenal states in general by way of arguing against the luminosity of feeling cold, that is, against the view that if one feels cold, one is at least in a position to know that one does. In this paper I consider four strategies that emerge from his discussion, and argue that none succeeds.
Keywords Williamson  luminosity  self-knowledge
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802587408
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References found in this work BETA
Ram Neta & Guy Rohrbaugh (2004). Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406.
Selim Berker (2008). Luminosity Regained. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (2):1-22.

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Citations of this work BETA
Declan Smithies (2012). Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
Amia Srinivasan (2015). Are We Luminous? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):294-319.

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