Coherentism
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2006)
| Abstract | Coherentism is a theory of epistemic justification. It implies that for a belief to be justified it must belong to a coherent system of beliefs. For a system of beliefs to be coherent, the beliefs that make up that system must “cohere” with one another. Typically, this coherence is taken to involve three components: logical consistency, explanatory relations, and various inductive (non-explanatory) relations. Rival versions of coherentism spell out these relations in different ways. They also differ on the exact role of coherence in justifying beliefs: in some versions, coherence is necessary and sufficient for justification, but in others it is only necessary | |||||||||
| Keywords | coherentism coherence epistemology justification | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesStephan Hartmann & Luc Bovens (2005). Why There Cannot Be a Single Probabilistic Measure of Coherence. Erkenntnis 63:361-374.
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