Philosophia 33 (1-4):331-334 (2005)
|Abstract||Ernest Sosa and others have proposed a safety condition on knowledge: If S knows p, then in the nearest (non-actual) worlds in which S believes p, p is true.1 Colloquially, this is the idea that knowing requires not being easily mistaken. Here, I will argue that like another condition requiring a counterfactual relation between a subject’s belief and the world, viz. Robert Nozick’s sensitivity condition, safety leads, in certain cases, to the unacceptable result that knowledge is not closed under known implication.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jonathan Vogel (2007). Subjunctivitis. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):73 - 88.
Avram Hiller & Ram Neta (2007). Safety and Epistemic Luck. Synthese 158 (3):303 - 313.
Kelly Becker (2007). Epistemology Modalized. Routledge.
Christoph Kelp (2009). Knowledge and Safety. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:21-31.
Juan Comesaña (2005). Unsafe Knowledge. Synthese 146 (3):395 - 404.
Marc Alspector-Kelly (2011). Why Safety Doesn't Save Closure. Synthese 183 (2):127-142.
Sven Bernecker (2012). Sensitivity, Safety, and Closure. Acta Analytica 27 (4):367-381.
Dani Rabinowitz, &Quot;the Safety Condition for Knowledge&Quot;. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads24 ( #57,791 of 722,703 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,873 of 722,703 )
How can I increase my downloads?