Extensional assumptions in theories of meaning and concepts
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):80-81 (1998)
| Abstract | The problems that Millikan addresses in theories of concepts arise from an extensional view of concepts and word meaning. If instead one assumes that concepts are psychological entities intended to explain human behavior and thought, many of these problems dissolve. | |||||||||
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