Knowability and bivalence: Intuitionistic solutions to the paradox of knowability [Book Review]

Philosophical Studies 149 (2):269 - 281 (2010)
Abstract
In this paper, I focus on some intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. I first consider the relatively little discussed idea that, on an intuitionistic interpretation of the conditional, there is no paradox to start with. I show that this proposal only works if proofs are thought of as tokens, and suggest that anti-realists themselves have good reasons for thinking of proofs as types. In then turn to more standard intuitionistic treatments, as proposed by Timothy Williamson and, most recently, Michael Dummett. Intuitionists can either point out the intuitionistc invalidity of the inference from the claim that all truths are knowable to the insane conclusion that all truths are known, or they can outright demur from asserting the existence of forever-unknown truths, perhaps questioning—as Dummett now suggests—the applicability of the Principle of Bivalence to a certain class of empirical statements. I argue that if intuitionists reject strict finitism—the view that all truths are knowable by beings just like us—the prospects for either proposal look bleak.
Keywords Paradox of Knowability  Semantic anti-realism  Bivalence  Idealisation  Intuitionistic conditional
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Michael Dummett (2007). Reply to Crispin Wright. In R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Open Court. 445--454.
    Michael Dummett (1987). Reply to Dag Prawitz. In Barry Taylor (ed.), Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy. Distributors for the United States and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 281--316.

    View all 24 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Similar books and articles
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-02-23

    Total downloads

    34 ( #43,058 of 1,089,047 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    2 ( #42,773 of 1,089,047 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.